Theistic Proofs (Can God be proved?)

By Steven Lester

In a recent conversation about one of my text books, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, a former graduate of Southwestern Theological Seminar, and current pastor, made the remark, “I believe here (referring to the minds of these intellectuals) is where there are great spiritual battles and strongholds.” After reflecting upon that remark coupled with my learning through this course, I agree with him. Within the philosophical arena there is a heated battle: an earnest contending for the faith by some, and by others, a desperate attempt to jettison God altogether. The ramifications are high. The philosophy of one generation seems to be the orthodoxy of the next. There is importance on many levels in learning the various schools of thought in regard to philosophy. The inquiring Christian would be greatly enriched by their study of Philosophy. The prudent pastor would find a range of answers in respect to current to moral enigmas by a brief study of the last generation’s philosophical theory. The truth searching soul can find a harbor of rest in their honest inquiry of the historical claims of Christianity. And, very importantly, the Christian apologetic and philosopher must be well versed in past and present philosophical trends so that they may effectively engage in today’s struggle for the faith.

With that said we come to our subject: to discuss the function of theistic proofs and some of the standard rebuttals generated in recent times as well as more attempts to reintroduce modified theistic arguments. This will serve as our thesis. The outline of the essay will naturally follow the major divisions in the thesis: first, to discuss the function of theistic proofs or arguments. Next, we shall discuss certain theistic proofs, common rebuttals and modern modifications of theistic proofs. In our attempt, I would like to stress the paradigm of this work will be from a Christian Theistic presupposition.

I feel the need to outline our work and place it in some context. A definition of our subject would be helpful at this point. The Theistic presupposition believes in the existence of one God and attributes various works to him. The works attributed to him vary from the different branches within theism. The different branches are Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Deism.

The concept of proofs or arguments will clarify our topic a little more. Ronald Nash provides some excellent material on the subject of proofs. (Nash 113) He shows how that a philosophical argument or proof, akin to what we are dealing with, is not the same as a mathematical proof. The difference lies in the absoluteness of the proof. A mathematical proof has more of a matter of fact outcome. It’s hard to argue with numbers. A philosophical argument cannot have this type of finality in the conclusion. A philosophical proof or argument has many other human variables. As a result we should not set the standard of proof with respect to Theism as we would in respect to Geometry.

Among the human variables is the matter of dealing with people’s belief systems. In order to concede to certain theistic proofs, the atheist must consider the possibility of the compromise of their own belief system. If one’s belief system is compromised the practical ramifications are tremendous. One would have to order their behavior according to their belief system. The stakes are raised much higher in reference to the matter of theistic proofs as opposed to mathematical proofs.

In the matter of philosophical proofs one is dealing with subjective reception of various arguments. A great deal of personal perception is factored into the grasping of one’s argument. Dr Nash states:

Sometimes people have difficulty with competing claims and systems because of philosophical presuppositions. But often, it seems clear, people’s theoretic judgments seem inordinately affected by nontheoretical factors. This is the case, for example, when racial prejudice causes people to hold certain untrue beliefs about those who are objects of the prejudice. Sometimes, these nontheortetic factors are idiosyncratic, unique to the particular person, rooted in that person’s individual history. 28

As stated above if the argument threatens one’s belief system, the argument may not be positively captured, regardless of how sound the proof may appear. We are not dealing in the area of conclusive proofs, but probability.

Theistic proofs therefore are meant to provide a philosophical argument for the existence of God in the absent of any sources of special revelation, i.e. the Bible. It is the position of this paper that theistic proofs, while worthy of exploration and use, should not be exalted over special revelation. Their function is to engage the philosophical community with a dialogue of argument rather than silence on the subject of God’s existence not to transport the unbeliever from unfaith to faith. Only the power of the Gospel can generate faith in the unbeliever.

Now let’s move onto a discussion of Theistic Proofs. The first being examined is the Cosmological argument. This argument has been proliferated over the years by various philosophers and the arguments have become sophisticated and modified in recent times. According to Dr. Ronald Nash the argument goes like this:

Cosmological arguments reason back from the existence of the world to a principle of being that explains the world. This being or principle is called in various versions of the argument by such names as the First Cause, the Prime Mover, the Necessary Being or the Sufficient Reason.

The concept of God as the First Cause goes like this: every effect appears to have had a cause, if one could traced down the first cause that cause would be God. God, of course, would not have had a cause. The standard arguments to this line of thinking are several. Colin Brown sums up the arguments as such: “…there is a problem of demonstrating that the first cause is the same as the prime mover or the great designer, and that both are the same as the Christian God.” 27 Another rebuttal argues that we don’t know if the first cause still exists. Another suggests can one even prove the probability of an infinitely long serious of cause and effects? Still another argument asks the question what if there were more than one first causes?

We now can move on to the concept of God as the Logical First Cause. This argument is a modification to the one we have just concluded discussing. According to Nash this concept argues:

God’s creative activity did bring the world into existence out of nothing; but it

also involves God’s continually sustaining the world in its existence. God is the necessary condition of the world in two senses: 1. Had God not created the world in the first place, it would have never have come into existence; and 2. should God ever will to withdraw his sustaining power, the world would cease to exist.

By restructuring the Cosmological argument in this posture it avoids some philosophical problems namely the provability of an infinitely long serious of cause and effects. Another problem it addresses is the question if the first cause still exists. The posture of the modified argument suggests the first cause must exist since the world still exists seeing that the first cause is also the sustainer of the world.

Now we must move on to the Teleological argument for God’s existence. This argument looks at the specific function of creation and infers the existence of a creator. David Hume gives an outstanding synopsis of the argument:

Look around the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance—of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble, and that the author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.

The Teleological argument seems to be, on the surface anyhow, a very powerful and persuasive argument. There are, however, problems that appear to diminish the forcefulness of the Teleological argument. One such argument recognizes the problem that the Teleological proof is based upon analogy. Reasoning based upon analogy cannot provide conclusive proof. Just because A and B demonstrate a connection does not mean that C and D has to demonstrate the connection of A and B. The particular analogy used to in an argument must be excepted if the argument holds water. If the analogy is rejected or altered the whole argument is compromised.

The use of analogy in the Teleological argument is problematic; therefore, the proof itself has been reduced to a hypothesis explaining the apparent design of creation. Charles Darwin’s theory of Evolution has filled the vacuum with its own theory as to the reason of creation’s apparent order and design. Nature has evolved over millennia in order to survive. This adaptation to survive within evolution indicates a design without referring to the work of an intelligent designer. These competing theories have taken some forcefulness from the Teleological argument.

In response to the growing popularity of Darwinism, the Teleological argument has been modified to include evolution. The modification suggests that God used the principles of evolution as a means in creating the universe. The two theories are not incompatible. In attempts to consolidate the two, a major focus has shifted from the particular examples of design to the general order of creation. This modification is known as the Wider Teleological Argument. Linwood Urban writes:

In summary, the argument maintains that the natural order not only makes possible human survival but also supports and fosters the moral and spiritual values of intelligent beings, and that this is the kind of universe one would expect a wise, benevolent, and powerful deity to have designed. Since the focus of the argument is not on the small-scale phenomena cited by Paley but on the large-scale phenomenon of the evolutionary process itself, it has become known as the Wider Teleological Arguments.

Another variation of the Teleological Argument is stated by Richard Taylor. He argues that if one believes that the arrangement of creation by an intelligent creator is purposeful then the creation would convey a message of the creator. If one believes that the universe is non-purposeful and an act of chance, then it is impossible for nature to give a message of meaning. If one holds to the latter, then even our own minds and sense organs are incapable of producing meaning. We then dwell in a real of utter darkness and meaninglessness.

There is much more we can say on this subject but we must move on to our next subject of consideration: the moral argument for God’s existence. Ronald Nash outlines this concept for us:

Many human experiences seem to point to the existence of moral laws or standards of behavior. Our failure to do something that we believe we ought to do may lead us to feel guilty. The failure of others to perform certain duties toward us may produce feelings of resentment or anger or sorrow. Whenever we dare suggest to someone else that his conduct is wrong, we are ding more than appealing to our own moral standard. Moral criticism like this would make no sense unless we also believed that the other person knew about the same moral standard. It is interesting to note that the person whose moral conduct is being criticized seldom denies the existence of the moral standard.

In view of the existence of a moral law seemingly written upon the conscious of humanity, one can point to the existence of God as the moral law giver. This is the moral argument for the existence of God in short. We now come to some common objections to this proof.

The first objection is that the moral law does not appear to be objective for everyone. For example there are certain cultures that hold opposing ethical views. There are various moral views in certain situations such as abortion, euthanasia, and war. These are difficult cases and the problem of the lack of objectivity remains in the moral argument for God’s existence.

Further attempts to add difficulty to the moral argument is to press the notion that morality is a result of evolution of instinct and the dynamic of living in a social setting. That is to say that existing in a social setting and interaction with other humans has created a system of moral principles. These moral principles evolve as the culture matures, and adapt based upon different ethical situations. Survival of the fittest employs moral programming for adequate adaptation.

Modern variations of the argument include Gordon Clark’s argument from truth. The argument goes as such:

1. Truth exists.
2. Truth is immutable.
3. Truth is eternal.
4. Truth is mental.
5. Truth is superior to the human mind.
6. Truth is God.

The argument simply says that truth must exist if knowledge exists. If truth exists then that truth must never change. Truth is also eternal and Nash says, “Any denial of the eternality of truth turns out to be an affirmation of its eternity.” (162) Truth also affirms the existence of a mind. Truth is grasped in the faculty of the mind. Although truth is grasped mentally, truth is greater than the mind. Truth is not confined to subjectivity and held by one individual. Truth is objective and overarching for all humanity. If truth is eternal, immutable, exists in the mind, and is greater than the human mind, truth must have its residence in the mind of God.

The last area of Theistic proofs we shall discuss is the area of religious experience. British theologian John Baillie argues that one can know that God is exists through their direct experience of him. He writes:

If I have a direct experience of x, then x exists.

I have a direct experience of God.

Therefore, God exists.

William Rowe offers a more detailed model for religious experience. His argument has five lines.

1. When subjects have an experience they take to be of x, it is rational to conclude that they really do experience x unless we have positive reason to think their experience delusive.
2. Experience occur which seem to their subjects to be of God.
3. There are no good reasons for thinking that all or most experiences which seem to their subjects to be of God delusive.
4. It is rational to believe tat at least some experiences which seem to their subjects to be of God really are experiences of God.
5. Therefore, it is rational to believe that God exists.

The argument is that if a person has an experience with God and there is no proof to the contrary that the experience is not of God then we must conclude that God exists. If at least one person has an experience of God then God exists or if one experience among many is of God, then God exists.

The principle of credulity is the name given to step one of Rowe’s argument. Much emphasis is placed upon the importance of such an argument. In short the principle of credulity says that any experience is innocent until proven guilty. If one treated experience as delusive until proven Ronald Nash says, “To ignore the principle and regard our experience as delusive until they are proven vertical would entrap us in a skepticism from which no escape seems likely.” (147) To ignore this principle would compromise the foundation of non-religious experience as well.

Obvious objections arise from this point. The most notable objection is the ability to confirm alleged religious experience. In order to satisfy the need to know if the experience actually came from God some conditions were implemented. These conditions are as follows: the object exists, the person’s experience is such that he is conscious of the object, and the object is part of the cause of the persons experience. (150) We therefore, need to confirm the existence of the object of one’s experience. Here is where Charles Martin tries to show the impossibility of knowing that certain experiences are from God. He concludes that experiences from God as the object are vastly different than ordinary natural objects. As a result he submits religious experiences should not be taken literally. His argument goes like this:

1. Nonreligious experiences provide warrant for the existence of their objects.
2. Therefore, experiences of God provide warrant for the existence of God. (150)

Certain rules of verification have been implemented in conformation of experiences. Sensory verification seems to be the popular verification. C.D. Broad states:

Now, in the case of sense-perception there are several tests which we can se to tell whether a perception is delusive or not. We can check one sense by another, e.g., sight by touch. We can appeal to the testimony of others and find out whether they see anything that corresponds to what we see. (151)

In the case of experience from God, sensory verification is not a viable option. Therefore, religious experience remains in doubt as the object of experience (God) cannot be verified.

There is an objection to sensory verification however. If one had an experience and wanted to verify the experience, one would have to check the experience by another sensory preceptor. That preceptor would need to be confirmed by another preceptor and that preceptor by another and the cycle goes on endlessly. If one is going to verify an experience the cycle of sensory verification must end at some point. The argument by Nash is: “there is no more reason to take the word of that final checking procedure than there was to trust the original experience as veridical.” 153

This brings us to the conclusion of our discussion. In quick recap, I hope to have shown the function of theistic proof are more suitable as a means of intelligent dialogue that engages the philosophical world. Theistic proofs are not absolute and are riddled with problems. They serve to open the skeptic and atheists minds to the rational possibility that there is a God. Our discussion was limited to the Cosmological argument, Teleological Argument, the Moral Argument and the Proof of God’s Existence by Religious Experience. We learned the nature, various modifications and standard rebuttals against certain theistic proofs.

It is my belief that attempt of the Christian philosophical community to engage the skeptic and atheist intellectually is paramount. In this intellectual arena is a fierce warfare where Satan is contending for the moral and spiritual center of humanity. God has given us mighty tools in the form of arguments wrapped in the context of scriptural truth. If we can give powerful argument in the philosophical context, then we may persuade someone to open their mind to scripture. We contend that it is only through scripture that a person moves to saving faith in Jesus Christ. Scripture says:

“For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strongholds, casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, and brining into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ.” II Corinthians 10:4-5